Introduction
This paper is an empirical investigation of how long institutions hold equities. Many theories and empirical studies in the finance literature are related to institutional holding periods, though none to our knowledge address the question of how institutions choose how long to hold a trade. In corporate finance, empirical studies routinely use the percentage of common stock held by institutions as a proxy for the sophistication of the investors holding the security, typically finding that companies held by "long term" institutions are better priced. Empirical studies find that stocks held by institutions are better governed (Chung and Zhang, 2011) , more efficiently priced (Boehmer and Kelley, 2009) , and have lower agency costs (Wang and Nanda, 2011) than stocks held by retail investors. In contrast, the literature on delegated portfolio management offers substantial evidence that institutions do not make decisions based on information or portfolio optimization. Mutual funds appear to select stocks based on familiarity (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999) , sell stocks based on the disposition effect (Frazzini, 2005) , engage in transactions solely for the purpose of presenting a more favorable list of stocks ("window dressing") (Sias and Starks, 1997) , and earn risk-adjusted returns lower than simple passive strategies (Gruber, 1996) . 1 For pension funds, the available evidence paints a similar picture (Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny, 1991 ).
Yet there has been little examination of the actual trading patterns of institutions as a window into whether their behavior indicates that they are informed optimizers.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the trade holding periods (durations) of institutions that buy and sell common stock. 2 We believe that the pattern of trade durations will inform the disparate views of institutions and may help to resolve some of the controversy over whether they behave as rational optimizers or exhibit agency problems and behavioral biases. If institutional trading is largely determined by portfolio managers acting as rational optimizers, we expect to see more short-duration trades when 1 A recent exception to the generally negative assessment of fund managers is provided by Berk and van Binsbergen (2012) , who find evidence that mutual fund manager skill exists and is persistent. 2 Throughout this paper we use the terms "trade holding period" and "trade duration" interchangeably to describe the amount of time from entry to exit in a round-trip trade. See Section 3.1 for a description of the identification of round-trip trades.
market volatility is higher, fund flow volatility is higher, and trading costs are lower. Furthermore, we expect informed traders to choose the holding period that maximizes the advantage of their information. If institutional trading is also affected by agency problems and behavioral biases, we expect to see the desire to demonstrate activity leading to short-duration trades with low returns, the disposition effect leading to higher realized returns in short-duration trades relative to longer-duration trades, or, alternatively, overconfidence leading to short-duration trades that have low returns.
3
Using a proprietary database of the daily U.S. equity transactions of over 4000 institutional money managers and pension funds, we match stock purchases and sales within each fund to identify the holding periods and returns of over 120 million round-trip trades between 1999 and 2009. For our trade duration analysis we focus on the subset of funds present in the database for at least five years: 1186 funds responsible for over 105 million round-trip trades, with a total volume of over 292 billion shares.
We find a surprising incidence of short-duration trades: over 96% of the institutional funds execute round-trip trades lasting less than one month, and in aggregate over seven percent of the volume occurs in trades that are held for less than one month (23% occurs in trades that are held for less than three months).
The prevalence of short-duration trades appears surprising in light of the typically low annual turnover rates for mutual funds and pension funds.
Our empirical results provide limited support for the idea that institutions make trading decisions based on portfolio optimization. For example, we find some evidence of shorter holding periods during times of higher market volatility, when the cost of being at a suboptimal portfolio allocation may be greater. But institutions appear to hold their trades longer when fund flow volatility is higher and hold illiquid stocks for shorter periods, all else equal, contrary to the rational optimizer predictions. We find little support for the disposition effect as a driver of short-duration trades. While some short-duration trades have high returns, short-duration trades have negative returns on average and many funds engage in unprofitable short-duration trades that do not appear consistent with simply "cutting one's losses." Shortduration trades are not more common following higher returns, suggesting that short-duration trading not driven by attribution-based overconfidence, although it may be due to overconfidence more generally or managers' desire to show they are active. We find evidence of persistent skill and/or information in funds' short-duration trade returns; we also find that some funds are persistently unskilled and/or uninformed. The picture that emerges suggests that the narrative of institutions as informed, sophisticated portfolio optimizers is at best a limited description.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we first build a simple model of institutional trading that forms the basis for our hypotheses and then consider deviations from the rational optimizing framework. Section 3 describes our data and sample and details our methodology for identifying round-trip trades. Section 4 presents our core analysis of trade holding periods, and section 5 extends our analysis into holding period returns and return persistence in short-duration trades. Section 6 discusses robustness checks, and section 7 concludes. Two appendices detail the matching of transaction data to CRSP and the implementation of double-clustered standard errors used throughout the paper.
Why do institutions trade?
To frame our analysis of institutional trade holding periods, it is useful to begin with a more fundamental question: Why do institutions trade? In the following subsection, we build a model of institutional trading that relates a fund manager's costs and benefits of trading to the holding period of the fund's trades. We then consider several additional factors that influence trade duration and outline testable hypotheses.
A baseline model
Trading is commonly thought of as related to information, investor flows, transaction costs, and optimization. To study the interplay between optimization and transaction costs, we model as a baseline an institution with no informational advantages and no inflows, outflows, agency problems, or behavioral biases. We assume the institution exists because it provides efficient portfolios at a lower transaction cost than that available to the clients who give it money. It is clear that the means, variances, and covariances defining the efficient set will change over time and that the portfolio manager must periodically change the weights to keep the portfolio efficient, but how often will the portfolio manager rebalance? Shortening the time interval between portfolio revisions reduces the chance of a suboptimal portfolio allocation but also increases the cost of trading. If the moments of the distribution are known with perfect certainty then the revision time is simply whenever the cost of inefficiency is greater than the transaction cost of revision. But since these moments must be estimated and are best known only ex-post, the revision time is random. If trade durations are random variables, can we still describe our stylized institution as optimizing trade holding periods by minimizing costs?
The answer is yes, if we are willing to further assume that the institution is long-lived and costs are stationary. To see this, denote the time between the (i-1) st and the i th revision as X i . Let F(x) = Pr(X i ≤ x) and assume that the random revision times X 1 ,X 2 ,.. are independent and identically distributed. This assumption of a stationary distribution of revision times clearly will not be the case in practice, but this baseline assumption lets us focus on revisions as a function of a random transaction cost and the random cost of suboptimality.
The X i generate a renewal process that is defined by counting the number of revisions in a specified time period. The total time for n revisions is the sum S n = X 1 +···+X n . Associated with the sum is a counting process that simply counts the number of revisions between two points in time. Let N(t) = the number of revisions between time 0 and time t, where N(0)=0. The revisions will generate a cost, Y i , composed of both a suboptimality cost and a transactions cost of re-aligning the weights. Ex-ante, the Y i are random for the same reason that X i are random: means, variances, and covariances are known only with historical data. The pairs, (X i , Y i ) are random variables, and we will assume that each series is i.i.d.
The portfolio manager's problem of choosing the optimal number of revisions over a horizon (0, τ] is one of minimizing costs. Since there are N(τ) revisions, he wishes to minimize the expected costs of N(τ) revisions or:
A standard result for the function A(τ) (see Karlin and Taylor, 1998, p. 432 ) is:
For large τ, the long-run cumulative cost per unit of time is approximately the expected cost of the first revision divided by the time to the first revision.
Putting more structure on the numerator of equation (1) gives a clearer picture of the determinants of trade holding periods in the baseline case. Suppose that the transaction cost is a constant, c 1 , and the cost of suboptimality, c 2 , is a function of time, c 2 =c 2 (T), where the decreased return and/or increased risk from not revising the portfolio grows over time, or 0. Intuitively the percentage of time that the portfolio is suboptimal is the probability that X i is less than or equal to T, or F(T), while the fraction of time that the portfolio will not be suboptimal is 1-F(T). We can write:
That is, if the portfolio becomes suboptimal before the portfolio manager trades, the cost is c 2 , otherwise the cost is c 1 from trading. Therefore, E(Y 1 ) = c 1 [1-F(T)] + c 2 F(T) and the expected long-run cost per unit of time using equation (1) is
where L 1 (T)= c 1 [1-F(T)]/E(X 1 ) and L 2 (T)=c 2 F(T)/ E(X 1 ). Since c 2 and F(T) are monotonically increasing in T and 0≤F(T) ≤ 1, we have that 0 and 0. Noting that L 1 (0)= c 1 and L 2 (0)=0, we can illustrate the portfolio manager's problem graphically as follows:
The cost minimization yields an optimal trading time, T * , which is a function of the transaction cost and the cost of suboptimality. A lower transaction cost would shift L 1 downward and shorten the optimal trading time. Faster changes in the efficient set would increase the cost of suboptimality, shifting L 2 upward and shortening the optimal trading time. 4 The baseline institution will therefore have a shorter trade holding period in markets with lower transaction costs and more estimation risk, which is clearly a function of the volatility of means, variances, and covariances. 
Information, investor flows, agency problems, and behavioral biases
In practice, trade durations (represented in the baseline model by the random revision times X 1 ,X 2 ,..) are likely not independent and identically distributed. The time interval between revisions may be a function of information advantages, flows into and out of the portfolio, agency problems, and behavioral biases. Below we highlight how each of these issues may affect institutional trade duration.
Institutions with information advantages will trade when the expected profit is greater than the cost of trading. Whether institutions actually have information advantages was first examined by Jensen (1968), who argued there is little evidence that the mutual fund industry produces significant risk-adjusted 4 Conversations with practitioners confirm that the baseline model developed here captures the intuition underlying the trading decisions of purely quantitative funds, which constantly weigh the trade-off between rebalancing needs and transaction costs, albeit with transaction costs modeled in a more sophisticated way. 5 It is also plausible that the estimation risk of an efficient portfolio increases with the risk of the efficient portfolio. If transaction costs do not increase with the risk of the portfolio, then the optimal trade holding period will fall as the risk of the efficient portfolio increases and the return increases. benefit from short-lived information advantages. At a minimum, it appears that information advantages are rare enough that they are unlikely to explain the majority of trades.
Investor flows into and out of the portfolio are a second potential reason for trading (e.g., Coval and Stafford, 2007 ). An optimizing fund will quickly respond to investor flows since increasing cash obtained from inflows or holding cash for outflows increases the suboptimality cost for the fund. Agency problems constitute a third reason for institutional trading. For both mutual fund managers and managers of funds with institutional clients, such as pension funds, lack of transparency and the nature of the industry create a fertile environment for agency problems, initially identified by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) . Fund managers may engage in window dressing, removing poor performers from a portfolio and/or purchasing stocks that have done well recently to present a more favorable impression of the fund's holdings. This tendency is particularly pronounced at the end of an evaluation period, such as the end of the calendar year, and has received considerable attention in the literature (e.g., Elton, Gruber, Blake, Krasny, and Ozelge, 2010; Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny, 1991; and Sias and Starks, 1997) . Agency problems may also lead fund managers to trade merely to show that they are doing something. Dow and Gorton (1997) predict that when clients cannot distinguish between when a portfolio manager is "actively doing nothing" (not trading because he finds 6 The reasons for fund inflows and outflows are themselves a widely studied topic in the finance literature. Sirri and Tufano (1998) are the first to identify the "flow performance" relationship for mutual fund investors, finding that investors respond far more to top performance than to poor performance, while studies examining retail investor flows find that mutual fund redemptions are idiosyncratic and based upon investors' liquidity needs (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison, 1997 Kumar, and Ng (2011) show that behavioral biases of investors spill over into their choice of mutual fund investments, which in turn could affect the holdings of these funds. With the exception of the disposition effect and overconfidence, these behavioral biases do not lead to specific predictions about the length of trade holding period of funds (except perhaps to prefer a longer holding period), but they generally suggest that trading strategies are chosen for reasons other than those captured in our baseline model of the rational optimizer.
Hypotheses
Informed optimizer. If institutional trading is responsible for increased efficiency in security pricing, we expect to find evidence that trading horizons are related to portfolio optimization, fund flows, and information. We refer to this description as the "informed optimizer" hypothesis.
The baseline model suggests that when transaction costs are lower or volatility is higher, institutions should trade more frequently. This has several implications for the frequency of trades of different holding periods. Institutions should choose longer holding periods for stocks with higher transactions costs. 8 Times of higher market volatility should lead to an increase in short-duration trades, as the cost of having a sub-optimal portfolio allocation is greater when volatility is higher. Furthermore, optimizing institutions should quickly respond to investor flows because holding cash positions for outflows or enlarging cash positions for inflows reduces portfolio efficiency. Thus higher volatility in mutual fund flows should result in more short-duration trading.
The baseline model predicts that there should be no relation between returns and trading horizon, because all optimizers choose efficient portfolios and optimize trade holding periods based on costs.
Extending the rational optimizer intuition to the case where institutions have information, fund managers should choose the holding period that maximizes the advantage of the information. Since some information is likely to be short-lived and other information is likely to be long-lived, institutions optimizing based on their informational advantages should not in aggregate lead to systematic patterns of returns across different holding periods unless it is the case that the majority of information has a particular lifespan.
Behavioral rent-seeker. The competing description of institutional investors is that they do not make decisions based on informed optimization but rather allow agency problems and behavioral factors to drive their portfolio choices. We refer to this description as the "behavioral rent-seeker" hypothesis.
If managers engage in trades that are not optimal, they will increase transaction costs and reduce the efficiency of the portfolio. This implies that trades related to behavioral, rent-seeking strategies will have low returns and managers will not be responsive to fund flows since the efficiency of the portfolio is not as important as other factors. If we assume that the reference point is the price at which a trade is initiated, the disposition effect implies that shorter duration trades should have higher returns and longer duration trades should have lower returns, as portfolio managers sell winners and hold on to losers.
Overconfidence implies that short-duration trades should have lower returns, as overconfident investors have a propensity to trade frequently but unsuccessfully. Trading simply to show that a portfolio manager is active should also lead to more short-duration trades with low returns, as they are undertaken for reasons other than maximizing returns. Window dressing could lead to low returns on either long-or short-duration trades, as window dressing has no direct implications for how long trades are held.
Data, Methodology, and Sample
We obtain institutional trading data from Ancerno Ltd., a widely recognized consulting firm that monitors execution trading costs for institutional clients. In order to provide execution cost analysis, Ancerno collects detailed transaction information for all equity transactions executed by each client.
Ancerno's clients include pension funds (such as CALPERS, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the
YMCA retirement fund) and money managers (such as Massachusetts Financial Services, Putnam
Investments, Lazard Asset Management, and Fidelity). 9 We also collect stock data and mutual fund turnover statistics from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP), pension fund turnover statistics from Mobius Group, and mutual fund flow data from the Lipper U.S. Funds Flow database, provided by Thomson Reuters.
Identifying Round-Trip Trades
To identify round-trip trades and their holding periods, we match buy and sell transactions for the same stock within the same fund. In this section we describe the two methods by which we match buy and sell transactions: first-in-first-out (FIFO) and last-in-first-out (LIFO). There is no clear consensus on which method should be used to match buy and sell transactions into round-trip trades. On one hand, a consultant to institutional fund managers told us that "the clock starts when you enter the trade," implying the FIFO approach may be more appropriate. On the other hand, LIFO may more accurately capture the change in opinion or information that causes a manager to switch from buying to selling or vice versa. In most of our analyses, the FIFO and LIFO trade matching methodologies yield identical inference, so we present only results based on the FIFO methodology; where the results differ materially we present and discuss both.
From the Ancerno database, we obtain the following information for each transaction: the ticker symbol of the security (symbol), the transaction date (tradedate), 10 the identifier for the institution Exhibit B: FIFO-matched round-trip trades Exhibit C presents the round-trip trades arising from the buy and sell transactions in Exhibit A using LIFO matching. The difference from the FIFO matching procedure is that under LIFO, when a transaction in the opposite direction enters the queue, we match it with the most recent (rather than the earliest) existing transaction in the queue.
Exhibit C: LIFO-matched round-trip trades As in this example, the FIFO and LIFO methodologies generally lead to different round-trip trade matching. 11 We conduct all of our analyses on both sets of round-trip trades, and where the results for FIFO-and LIFO-based round-trip trades differ materially we present and discuss both.
We note that the Ancerno dataset has no information on a fund's holdings at any time; only transactions are reported to Ancerno. Our method effectively initializes each symbol-clientcodeclientmgrcode combination with zero shares, and we discard the first two years of the dataset to minimize the effect the initialization may have on our identification of round-trip trades. All of our analyses are based on round-trip trades from the sample period January 1999 to December 2009.
We apply the following filters to remove potentially misleading or erroneous trades. We discard all trades with clientcode equal to zero, which indicates that Ancerno cannot reliably track the fund over time. We also discard trades with buy price or sell price less than one cent. To ensure that the number of shares traded and the trade prices are comparable between the buy and sell dates, we exclude round-trip trades in which the buy and sell dates straddle a stock split date, e.g., the stock was bought before a split date and sold after the split date. 12 Approximately 6% of the FIFO round-trip trades (5% of the LIFO round-trip trades) are eliminated from our sample by this screen; fewer LIFO trades are eliminated because they tend to be shorter and span fewer of the stock split dates.
Calculating Returns
We calculate the raw return for each round-trip trade as the percentage price change over the holding period. We also calculate a market-adjusted return for each round-trip trade by subtracting the return on the S&P 500 index over the trade holding period from the round-trip trade's raw return. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample of round-trip trades and for the subsample of trades made by funds that are present in the Ancerno universe for at least five years. A natural concern when analyzing trade holding periods is whether the incidence of short-duration trades is unduly influenced by the presence of funds that remain in the universe for only a short period of time. For example, we cannot observe round-trip trades longer than one year for a fund that is in the universe for only one year. Of the 4053 unique funds appearing in the universe between 1999 and 2009, 1059 funds are present for only one year or less, and 1186 funds are present for five or more years. In Table 1 we present descriptive statistics for both the full sample of 4053 funds and the subsample of 1186 funds that 12 From CRSP, we identify 4800 stock splits and stock dividends (CRSP DISTCD = 5523, 5533, 5543) involving 2795 stocks in our sample. (See Appendix for details of matching Ancerno data to CRSP.) We note that the inclusion of dividend distributions in this filtering treatment is a conservative approach. If managers typically keep the shares they receive as a stock dividend, retaining trades straddling dividend dates will affect the quantity in the calculation of round-trip trades; however, if managers automatically convert dividend distributions into cash, stock dividends would be immaterial to our round-trip trade calculations. Since we cannot identify which action specific managers adopt with respect to stock dividends, we discard all round-trip trades straddling stock dividend distributions as well as stock splits.
Sample Descriptive Statistics
are present for at least five years, which are the focus of our study; in the remainder of the paper we present results only for the sample of funds present for at least five years.
[ Table 1 here]
Panel A of Table 1 shows that the 4053 funds in the full sample belong to 772 distinct institutions; the subsample of 1186 funds present for five or more years belong to 324 distinct institutions.
In both samples the median institution has three funds. In the full sample, there are over 329 billion shares and over $10 trillion in round-trip trades. 13 Although only 29% of the funds in Ancerno are present for five or more years (1186 of the 4053 funds), they account for about 89% of the share volume and dollar volume in the full sample. These long-lived funds also trade over 96% of the stocks traded in the full sample. In both the full sample and the subsample of funds present five or more years, the majority of the funds are pension funds, but the majority of trading is done by money managers. For example, among the funds present five or more years, money managers represent only seven percent of the funds but account for over 93% of the share volume traded. We analyze money managers and pension funds separately because their differences may lead to different inference (e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992).
Panel B of Table 1 shows that the trades in both the full sample and the subsample of funds present for five or more years are heavily weighted towards large-capitalization stocks. Over 80% of the share volume in each sample occurs in stocks in the two largest market-capitalization deciles, while less than half a percent of the share volume occurs in the two smallest deciles. This pattern of much higher institutional trading volume in large-cap stocks is consistent with the literature on institutional holdings. percentile) constitute about 1% of total institutional holdings. 13 We note that the number of round-trip trades, also reported in the table for completeness, may not be as informative as the volume statistics, both because the average size of equity trades falls considerably during the sample period (Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2011) and because in some cases our identification of round-trip trades counts orders that are executed in multiple pieces as separate trades. Hvidkjaer (2008) provides evidence that institutions increasingly engage in order splitting strategies resulting in more small trades originating from large institutional investors.
Before turning to the analysis of how long institutions hold their trades, it is useful to consider what we already know about institutional turnover. Table 2 presents mean and median fund turnover statistics for mutual funds for the length of our sample period and for pension funds for most of the period. 14 The time-series averages of the mean and median turnover percentages in both types of institutional funds are below 100%, with pension funds generally exhibiting lower turnover than mutual funds. But there may be considerable dispersion in trade holding periods within and across funds. For example, a turnover rate of 100% could arise from a fund trading all of its positions once a year, or trading half of its positions twice a year and not trading the other half of its positions, or a wide array of other combinations of short-and long-duration trades. Clearly, the greater the dispersion of trade durations that make up a turnover rate, the less informative is the turnover rate about trade durations.
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Our dataset of round-trip trades at the fund level provides a window into the trade durations behind fund turnover numbers.
[ Table 2 here] of share volume occurs in trades held less than one month and over 51% in trades held less than three months (Aggregate Shares, Cumulative % column). Within these categories, the incidence of trades lasting less than one day (0.32% of FIFO and 6.37% of LIFO share volume) is particularly surprising for institutional money manager and pension fund portfolios.
Further insight is provided by the cross-sectional fund-level statistics in the last four columns of hypotheses concern the behavior of individual fund managers, our subsequent analysis will examine fundlevel behavior as well as the aggregate sample of trades.
[ Table 3 here]
Together, Tables 2 and 3 suggest that although the average trade holding period (reflected in turnover statistics in Table 2 ) for institutional funds is much longer, many institutional money managers undertake a significant number of short duration trades (Table 3) . Figure 1 provides further insight into the prevalence of short-duration trades at the fund level. The incidence of short-duration trades is not driven by only a few extremely active funds in the Ancerno universe: Of the 1186 funds that are present for five or more years, only 42 of the funds engage in no round-trip trades lasting less than one month based on the FIFO method of identifying round-trip trades (top graph). Of the other 1144 funds, trades lasting less than one month account for up to 10% of trading volume in 994 funds, 10% to 20% of trading in 106 funds, and over 20% in the remaining 44 funds. The remaining graphs in Figure 1 depict the analogous fund frequency distributions for trades defined under the LIFO method and for trade holding periods of less than three months.
[ Figure 1 here]
Why do institutional fund managers engage in these short-duration trades? The evidence on the relationship between turnover and performance is mixed. Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) document a positive relation between turnover and portfolio performance, while Carhart (1997) finds a negative relation between turnover and net mutual fund returns. At the stock level, Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe (1998) and Lee and Swaminathan (2000) find that, on average, low turnover stocks earn higher returns than high turnover stocks. In the following two sections we examine several hypotheses regarding the frequency and returns of trades with different holding periods in an attempt to understand why institutions that generally hold long-term portfolios engage in short-duration trades.
Informed optimizer results
This section examines the hypotheses that are derived from the notion of the institutional fund manager as an informed optimizer. If fund managers behave as informed optimizers, we expect to see shorter trade holding periods when market volatility is higher and when fund flow volatility is higher. We also expect to see longer trade holding periods for stocks that are more illiquid, and no relation between holding period and trade return. [ Table 4 here]
The relation between market volatility and trade holding period is negative for pension funds, consistent with the informed optimizer prediction, but insignificant for money managers. Contrary to the informed optimizer predictions, both money managers and pension funds have longer trade holding periods when mutual fund flow volatility is higher. In terms of liquidity, we find no support for the informed optimizer prediction of longer holding periods for more illiquid stocks: money manager FIFO trades and both LIFO and FIFO trades of pension funds have shorter holding periods for more illiquid stocks, while money manager LIFO trades show an insignificant relation between holding period and stock illiquidity. Finally, we find a strong positive relation between trade return and trade holding period, contrary to the informed optimizer prediction that fund managers should choose the most profitable holding period for each trade, leading to no relation between holding period and return. Not only is the relation between return and holding period strongly positive, it is also the largest coefficient among all of the explanatory variables in each regression. 
Behavioral rent-seeker results
In this section we examine predictions derived from the depiction of fund managers as behavioral rent-seekers. We first examine the distribution of short-duration trades during the year, and then move on to analyze in more detail the positive relation between trade returns and trade holding periods that emerged above. While the informed optimizer depiction of institutional fund managers predicts no relation between trade holding periods and returns, the behavioral rent-seeker depiction suggests several possible relations. The disposition effect predicts that institutional managers will sell winners and hold on to losers, which would result in higher returns for shorter-duration trades and lower (or negative) returns on longer-duration trades. In contrast, the overconfidence hypothesis suggests that short-duration trades should have low returns, as overconfident managers tend to trade frequently but unprofitably. Trades undertaken to show that fund managers are active are also expected to have low returns, as they are undertaken for reasons unrelated to profit maximization and on average are likely to lose the bid-ask spread. Table 5 examine the dispersion of trade returns across funds, by calculating the raw and market-adjusted returns for the trades of each fund in each holding period category and presenting the mean and median fund returns for money managers and pension funds separately. We note that we report returns as the percentage price change in the stock, ignoring explicit transaction costs such as commissions, so the returns calculated here should be viewed as the upper limit on a trade's true profit.
[ Table 5 here]
The aggregate trade returns columns in Table 5 show that with the exception of intraday trades, the average raw and market-adjusted return is generally lower for trades held less than two years than for trades held longer than two years. Furthermore, average returns for trades held longer than one day and less than one year are generally negative, even on a market-adjusted basis. 18 The fund-level trade returns columns show the mean and median returns across the short-duration trades of funds are also negative except for the intraday trades. The results in Table 5 do not support the informed optimizer prediction of equal returns across trade holding periods. Neither do the results show much evidence of the disposition effect, i.e., that managers sell winners and hold onto losers; however, it is worth noting that our interpretation of the disposition effect assumes that the purchase price is the reference point. 19 The results are broadly consistent with the overconfidence hypothesis of managers trading frequently and unprofitably, but they could also reflect the agency costs of short-duration trades undertaken for reasons such as to show that managers are active. Overall, the pattern of returns raises an important question:
Why are institutional investors engaging in so many short-duration trades, which do not appear to generate positive returns and appear inconsistent with our general impression of institutional money managers and pension funds as long-term investors with low turnover?
One potential explanation is that fund managers may unwind loss-making trades early because they receive new information suggesting that the trades will be even more unprofitable over the longer term, so they "cut their losses." To examine this possibility, in Table 6 we perform the following simulation. For each trade that is held for less than one month in Table 5 , we calculate what its return would have been if it had been held for a full year (the point where the average fund-level return turns positive in Table 5 [ Table 6 here]
The results in Table 6 show that both in aggregate and at the fund level, the mean and median trades that were actually held less than one month would have produced a positive return had they been held for a full year. This suggests that the negative returns earned on short-duration trades are not explained by fund managers cutting their losses in light of new information they receive shortly after they initiate trades.
Although short-duration trades do not earn positive returns on average, some funds do earn positive returns in each holding period category (e.g., in Table 5 the 75 th percentile is positive in most holding period categories), which could be due to trading skill, information, or simply luck. To examine the extent to which information or skill can explain the fund-level results, we examine the persistence of funds' short-duration trade performance in Table 7 .
[ Table 7 here] Table 7 presents the results of tests for return persistence for short-duration trades at the fund level. In each semiannual period we sort funds into quintiles based on their performance for shortduration trades held less than one day (Panels A and B) or less than three months (Panels C and D). Note that the returns reported are for a particular category of trades within each fund, not for the fund's overall performance. 20 We report the average market-adjusted return for funds in each quintile in the base semiannual period (when the quintiles are assigned) and in the four subsequent semiannual periods. The return persistence demonstrated by funds' short-duration trades in Table 7 is consistent with both Odean's (1999) overconfidence theory and Dow and Gorton's (1997) agency theory of trading to appear active. To further investigate the overconfidence explanation, we examine the link between returns and subsequent short-duration trading activity. When combined with attribution bias, overconfidence predicts that following a period of high (low) realized returns, investors mistakenly attribute the returns to their own skill and as a consequence tend to trade more (less) in subsequent periods (Gervais and Odean, 2001 ). Trading to appear active predicts no relation between returns and subsequent trading activity. In Table 8 we sort funds into quintiles based on their short-duration trade returns in the base period (as in Table 7 ), but we report the average percentage of short-duration trading (rather than the trade returns) in each subsequent period in the table. In most cases the amount of short-duration trading is not higher in subsequent periods for funds with the highest base-period returns (Quintile 5) than for funds with the lowest base-period returns (Quintile 1). The only three subsequent-period observations with significant
Quintile 5 minus Quintile 1 differences occur for money managers and provide mixed results: for trades held less than one day (Panel A) the difference is significantly positive two periods after the base period (consistent with overconfidence), but for trades held less than three months (Panel C) the difference is significantly negative two and four periods after the base period. Overall, the picture that emerges suggests that whatever overconfidence fund managers may be exhibiting is not directly related to attribution bias.
[ Table 8 here]
Robustness checks
Results for the full sample of funds in the Ancerno universe (4053 funds) are qualitatively similar to those presented in the paper (which are based on the 1186 funds present for five or more years), with the exception that the full sample implies that a larger proportion of trades are short-duration, because funds that are present for only a short period of time can contribute only short-duration trades. For brevity, in most tables we present only results using the FIFO method to identify round-trip trades; results using the LIFO method yield identical inference except where both FIFO and LIFO results are presented. (Tables 7 and 8 ). All results involving trades held for up to one week, up to one month, and up to three months are robust to dropping intraday trades.
Conclusion
Examining the daily U.S. equity trades of 1186 institutional funds present in the Ancerno database for at least five years, we identify holding periods and returns of over 105 million round-trip trades between 1999 and 2009, with a total volume of over 292 billion shares. We find wide dispersion in trade holding periods. All of the institutional funds execute round-trip trades lasting over a year, and 96%
of them also execute trades lasting less than one month. In aggregate over seven percent of volume occurs in trades that are held for less than one month (23% are held for less than three months). Within the lessthan-one-month category are a significant number of trades that are held for less than a week and even less than one day. The prevalence of short-duration trades appears surprising in light of the typically low turnover rates for mutual funds and pension funds.
While there is some evidence that holding periods are shorter when market volatility is higher, the pattern of holding periods otherwise appears broadly inconsistent with the predictions of a model of institutional investors as rational informed optimizers. On average most short-duration trades do not generate high returns; on the contrary, the average returns for trades held less than a year are mostly negative, whether measured as raw returns or adjusted for market returns. The exception is intraday trades, which earn positive returns on average. Our analysis of trade returns at the fund level shows that while the mean and median funds do not earn positive returns on short-duration trades other than intraday trades, some funds do earn positive returns on short-duration trades and their returns tend to persist, suggesting some benefit from trading skill and/or information. But other funds exhibit persistent poor performance in short-duration trades, consistent with managers who are overconfident or trading to appear active.
Appendix A: Matching Ancerno trade records to CRSP data
Although the Ancerno data include identifiers for each stock, the variables named "ticker" and "cusip" are not the same as those used in databases such as CRSP, and different Ancerno clients report different tickers and cusips for the same stock. Ancerno provides a unique identifier for each stock -the stockkey -but this identifier is not present in CRSP. Because there is no linking variable that joins the CRSP and Ancerno data, we use a multi-step process to match firms in the Ancerno database to firms in the CRSP database. For every date, ticker, cusip, and stockkey combination in Ancerno, we match the Ancerno ticker to the CRSP permno using the ticker and cusip. For stockkey assignments that match multiple tickers, we generate a list of all the variations of the ticker symbol in Ancerno and match it to the most likely valid ticker from CRSP. For example, for the ticker AAPL in CRSP, Ancerno has AAPL, AAPL.OQ, AAPL US, AAPL.O, AAPL.NC, and several others. For all non-strict matches (in this example, AAPL.OQ, AAPL US, AAPL.O, and AAPL.NC), we compare the prices of the ticker AAPL to these other ticker symbol variations. If they exactly match in price on the same date, we assume that these are the same security -AAPL. Using this logic, we create a master file that produces a one-to-one match between each Ancerno stockkey and CRSP permno. We use this linking master file to merge the Ancerno records on daily institutional transactions to CRSP data. 
Panel B: Market-adjusted returns
At least Less than Mean Median 25th P'tile 75th P'tile Mean Median 25th P'tile 75th P'tile 1 day n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
